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Health-Health Tradeoffs
Cass R. Sunstein*
I. The Problem
My purpose in this essay is to discuss a pervasive problem in risk
regulation, one that helps account for regulatory failure and that is
only now receiving public attention.1 The problem occurs when the
diminution of one health risk simultaneously increases another health
risk. Thus, for example, fuel economy standards, designed partly to
reduce environmental risks, may make automobiles less safe, and in
that way increase risks to life and health.2 Regulations designed to
control the spread of AIDS and hepatitis among health care
providers may increase the costs of health care, and thus make health
care less widely available, and thus cost lives.3 If government bans
the manufacture and use of asbestos, it may lead companies to use
more dangerous substitutes.4 Regulation of nuclear power may make
nuclear power safer; but by increasing the cost of nuclear power,
such regulation will ensure reliance on other energy sources, such as
coal-fired power plants, which carry risks of their own.5 When
government requires reformulated gasoline as a substitute for ordi-
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1See Graham & Wiener, Risk Vs. Risk (1995), for the best general dis-
cussion; I owe a general debt to Graham and Wiener throughout.
2See Crandall, Policy Watch: Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, 6 J of Econ Persp 171 (1992).
3See ADA v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 826 (7th Cir. 1993): “OSHA also
exaggerated the number of lives likely to be saved by the rule by ignoring lives
likely to be lost by it. since the increased cost of medical care, to the extent
passed on to consumers, will reduce the demand for medical care, and some
people may lose their lives as a result.”
4See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
5See Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts’ Role in the Nuclear Energy
Controversy, 91 Harv L Rev 1833 (1978).
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nary gasoline, it may produce new pollution problems. When
government regulates air pollution, it may encourage industry to
increase the volume of solid waste, and in that sense aggravate
another environmental problem. A ban on carcinogens in food ad-
ditives may lead consumers to use noncarcinogenic products that
carry greater risks in terms of diseases other than cancer.6
The general problem is ubiquitous. It stems from the fact that
government officials, like individual citizens and the public as a
whole, suffer from both limited information and (even more
important) selective attention. A large current priority is to develop
mechanisms that overcome the problems posed by the fact that
people—both citizens and regulators—tend to focus on problems
that are parts of complex wholes.
My goal here is to explore the relation between health-health
tradeoffs and the law, in an effort to see how governmental judg-
ments on this topic might be improved. I develop a simple frame-
work for deciding how regulatory agencies should approach such
tradeoffs. I suggest that this framework is complicated by reference
to some peculiar features of individual and collective rationality in
risk assessment.
I also deal with the respective roles of courts, Congress, and the
President in managing health-health tradeoffs. I urge that often
agencies ought to be taken to have legal authority to make such
tradeoffs, and that they ought to exercise that authority much more
than they now do. To this end I argue for an interpretive principle
to the effect that agencies should be allowed to consider health-
health tradeoffs in the absence of a clear congressional statement to
the contrary. I also urge a modest but far from trivial judicial role in
requiring agencies to consider aggregate rather than isolated risks.
Thus I claim that agency decisions that increase aggregate risk levels
should be found arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).
More generally, I urge that Congress should amend the APA to
require agencies to consider ancillary risks and to minimize net risks.
I also argue that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) should see the reduction of overall risk as one of its
                                                                                                               
6See Richard Merrill, FDA’s Implementation of the Delaney Clause, 5
Yale J. Regulation 1, 60-61 (1988).
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principal missions. Much more than it now does, it should
undertake a coordinating function so as to ensure that this mission is
carried out. In these ways I hope to connect the question of sensible
outcomes, or outcomes that do not suffer from the problem of
excessively selective attention, with the subject of institutional
design. A large problem for government institutions is to devise
systems to ensure that problems of myopia or selective attention do
not defeat regulatory regimes; the management of health-health
tradeoffs is an important part of that project.
The essay is organized as follows. In Part I, I provide a simple
conceptual map, designed to make some relevant distinctions. In
Part II, I offer a first approximation of an approach to health-health
tradeoffs; the first approximation is an effort to limit aggregate risks
understood in “expected value” terms. I then suggest that this first
approximation must be qualified by reference to some complexities in
ordinary citizen judgments about risk. People care not simply about
“expected value,” and not simply about how many lives are saved, but
also about whether risks are involuntarily incurred, especially
dreaded, inequitably distributed, potentially catastrophic, faced by
future generations, and so forth. Reflective judgments of this sort
diverge from both expert and economic valuations, though in
interestingly different ways. Those reflective judgments bear a great
deal on how we think about the “rationality” of risk regulation.
Part III deals with existing law, urging agencies to undertake
more health-health tradeoffs than they now do, and explaining how
a judicial role could encourage this to happen. Part IV deals with
how Congress and the President might approach health-health
tradeoffs in a way that diminishes the problems associated with the
“pollution of the month” syndrome and with myopia or selective
attention.
I. A Conceptual Map
A. Regulated and Ancillary Risks
To get a handle on the problem of health-health tradeoffs, we
need to make some distinctions. Call the risks that government is
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trying to control the regulated risks. Call the risks that are increased
by regulation the ancillary risks.7
Ancillary risks take many different forms, depending on their
relationship to the regulated risk. We might say that the increase in
acid deposition is not within the same domain as the risks prevented
by regulation of nuclear power plants. This is true in two different
ways, legal and factual. First, and for many purposes most important,
the law does not consider it in the same domain, for the agency that
regulates one of these risks, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), has no authority to regulate the other, which is governed by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). A pervasive problem
in handling health-health tradeoffs stems from organization charts
that allocate authority to diverse agencies, in a way that makes
coordinated responses difficult or impossible. Second, the risk of acid
deposition (mostly from coal-fired power plants), simply as a matter
of fact, has a different source from the risk from nuclear power
plants. The point is important because it suggests that health-health
tradeoffs will often require agencies to compile extensive informa-
tion, possibly in a way that will dwarf existing capacities. Compare a
situation in which the regulation of sulfur dioxide emissions
increases emissions of carbon monoxide. If this happens, we are
dealing in any event with air pollution, indeed air pollution from
largely the same technologies, and the EPA has the statutory
authority to regulate both sources.
It is therefore possible to imagine a complex continuum of
relationships between regulated risks and ancillary risks. Of course
there are differences among risks of degree as well as differences of
kind, especially in the factual domain, where there is often an
element of overlap between relevant inquiries. And of course we
might describe the domain of the regulated risk in many different
ways. For some purposes the best way to define the risk domain is
through the relevant law, which, as we will see, sets constraints on
the kinds of risk that agencies might consider.
A well-functioning administrative state would seek a measure of
coordination among agencies, so that an agency operating in one
domain does not inadvertently or unnecessarily increase risks in
                                                                                                               
7Cf. the discussion of target risks and countervailing risks in Graham and
Wiener, supra note.
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other domains, and so that risk judgments are made as globally as
possible. At least as a presumption, agencies should coordinate their
efforts so as to reduce net or overall risks. But a special problem for
coordinated responses is that agencies have quite different standards
for deciding when risks require regulation.8 The International
Commission on Radiological Protection, for example, recommends
that environmental factors should not cause an incremental cancer
risk, for those exposed over a lifetime, of about 3 in 1,000. But
American agencies do not follow this recommendation, and their
own practices are wildly variable. The NRC sees 1 in 1,000 as
acceptable; the EPA’s acceptable range varies from 1 in 10,000 to 1
in 1,000,000. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has tried
to use a standard of 1 in 1,000,000, but under the now-repealed
Delaney Clause, courts required a standard of essentially zero.9 The
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) under-
standing of the “significant risk” requirement found in its governing
statute10 means a risk of 1 in 1,000; labor groups have sought an
increase to 1 in 1,000,000.
These varying standards make health-health tradeoffs quite
complex. If one agency is using a standard of 1 in 1,000 for risk A,
and doing so lawfully, how should it deal with an increase in risk B,
when that risk is regulated by a different agency operating lawfully
under a different standard? Matters become even more complex
when risks from cancer are being compared with other sorts of risk.
I do not urge that judgments about significance must be uniform.
Contextual differences may justify different judgments about which
risks warrant special concern. But such judgments should be made in
a self-conscious and informed rather than ad hoc way. I return to
this issue below.
There are many different mechanisms by which risk regulation
may increase aggregate risks.11 All of these mechanisms have a
                                                                                                               
8See Sadowitz and Graham, A Survey of Permitted Residual Cancer
Risks, 6 RISK 17 (1995).
9Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (DC Cir 1987); Les v. Reilly, 968
F.2d 985 (9th Cir 1992).
10See Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 US 607 (1980).
11See Graham & Wiener, supra, at 23-25; Aaron Wildavsky, Searching
for Safety (1987).
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degree of complexity, and hence collective judgments that respond
to them may well misfire.
—A regulatory ban may result in independent health risks
coming from ancillary “replacement” risks. If we ban sub-
stance A, the replacement substance B may be dangerous
too. If a carcinogenic substance is regulated, perhaps people
will use a product that is not carcinogenic but that causes
serious risks of heart disease.
—Regulation may produce a new, offsetting risk that is
qualitatively similar to or indistinguishable from the target
risk. Perhaps regulation of some substances that threaten
to destroy the ozone layer will produce greater use of other
substances that also threaten the ozone layer.
—Regulation may force society to lose or forego
“opportunity benefits.” For example, careful screening pro-
cedures that keep out drugs and services may deprive people
of certain health benefits at the same time that they pro-
tect people from certain health risks. This problem has
received recent attention with respect to the Food and
Drug Administration, especially with its efforts to control
the spread of AIDS.
—Regulated substances may have health benefits as well as
health risks, and by eliminating those health benefits,
regulation may therefore create health dangers on balance.
—Regulation of one risk may protect a certain group of
people while imposing a new risk on another group. This
may happen if, for example, a ban on a certain pesticide
protects consumers, plants, and animals while increasing
risks to farmers.
—Most generally, the economic costs imposed by regula-
tion may create health risks as well, as we shall soon see.
When officials think about health-health tradeoffs, the distri-
butional incidence of the ancillary risk may matter a great deal.
Sometimes the ancillary risk falls on the same class of people as the
regulated risk; sometimes the ancillary risk burdens an entirely
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different group. This may matter a great deal for policy purposes; it
suggests that risk redistribution, rather than risk reduction, is a
possible goal and outcome of regulation. Interest groups may well try
to exploit this possibility. Hence it should be expected that odd
coalitions will develop to reduce risks of a certain kind when the
result is to shift risks (and control costs) from some groups to
others.12
B. “Richer Is Safer”
Thus far we have been discussing cases in which the act of regu-
lating one risk produces ancillary risks through a certain causal chain;
there is a particularly controversial version of this possibility, one that
has been receiving much recent attention. Regulations cost
money—sometimes a great deal of money—and private expenditures
on regulatory compliance may produce less employment and more
poverty. People who are unemployed or poor tend to be in worse
health and to live shorter lives.13 If wealthy people face diminished
threats to life and health, and if poor people face greater threats,
might not costly regulation increase risks simply by virtue of
reducing wealth?
There are several reasons why this might be so.14 First, people
with more wealth have more capacity to spend their income on
health-enhancing goods and activities. For example, poor people
have inferior housing and a lower rate of smoke detector install-
ment, and this may be connected with greater deaths from fire.
Second, people who are poorer also suffer from various stresses that
may have adverse health effects. Finally, greater social wealth is as-
sociated with more general social changes in the direction of greater
safety, though the relevant mechanism is not well understood.
This possibility has been reflected in legal opinions, perhaps
most prominently in Judge Easterbrook’s suggestion that a fetal
protection policy might “reduce risk attributable to lead at the cost of
increasing other hazards,” including the hazards stemming from less
income, since “there is also a powerful link between the parents’
                                                                                                               
12See Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (1981).
13See Aaron Wildavsky, Searching for Safety 59-75 (1987).
14 See Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill, 22 Ecology LQ 729
(1995).
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income and infants’ health.”15 The more general question is this:
Would it be possible to connect governmentally required expendi-
tures on risk-reduction with shifts in unemployment and poverty?
An incipient literature attempts to do precisely this. A 1990 study
attempted to develop a model to quantify the view that “richer is
safer.”16 According to Keeney, a single fatality might result from a
compulsory expenditure of from $6.49 million to $7.5 million; with
different assumptions about the distributional incidence of the costs,
the estimate could range between $3 million and $12 million. In a
concurring opinion in a 1991 case involving occupational safety and
health regulation, Judge Williams invoked this evidence to suggest
that OSHA’s refusal to engage in cost-benefit analysis might not be
beneficial for workers.17 Judge Williams reasoned in the following
way. If a fatality results from an expenditure of $7.5 million, some
regulations might produce more fatalities than they prevent. Many
regulations of course cost more than $7.5 million per life saved. In
Judge Williams’ view, an agency that fails to measure costs against
benefits might be failing to measure mortality gains against losses.
The claimed relationship between wealth reductions and mor-
tality is controversial.18 But a number of studies find such a relation-
ship. Consider the following summary.19
                                                                                                               
15Intl Union v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 908 (7th Cir., 1989)
(Easterbrook, F., dissenting), reversed, 499 US 187 (1991).
16Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 Risk
Analysis 147 (1990). See also Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by the Costs of
Regulations, 8 J Risk and Uncertainty 95 (1994).
17UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (DC Cir 1991). See also Building &
Constr. Trades Dept. v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258 (DC Cir 1988), suggesting that
“leaning toward safety may sometimes have the perverse effect of increasing
rather than decreasing risk.” Id. at 1267. See also New York State v. Brown,
854 F.2d 1379, 1395 n. 1 (DC Cir., 1988 (Williams, J., concurring): “extravagant
expenditures on health may in some instances affect health adversely, by
foreclosing expenditures on items—higher quality food, shelter, recreation,
etc.—that would have contributed more to the individual’s health than the
direct expenditures thereon.”
18See Portney and Stavins, Regulatory Review of Environmental Policy, 8
J Risk and Uncertainty 111 (1994).
19Borrowed from Lutter and Morrall, Health-Health Analysis, 8 J Risk
and Uncertainty 43, 49 (1994)
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table 1
Study Data
Implicit Income
Gains Necessary
to Avert One
Death (millions) Comments
Keeney (1990) Used income and
mortality correla-
tions from Kitagawa
and Hauser (1960)
data, and others
$12.3 Cited in UAW v.
OSHA, as $7.25 1980
dollars. Represents
an upper-bound
Jnt. Economic
Committee
(1984)
Aggregate U.S. in-
come, employment,
mortality and mor-
bidity; 1950-1980
$1.8 to $2.7 Reflects income loss
from recession of
1974-1975
Anderson and
Burkhauser
(1985)
4, 878 male workers
over 10 years, 1969-
1979
$1.9 (wages) $4.3
(other income)
Older workers aged
58-63. Measured ef-
fects of wages and of
value of one’s home
on mortality
Duleep (1986) 9,618 white married
male workers aged
35-64 over 6 years,
1973-1978
$2.6 Controls for prior
disability, and edu-
cational attainment
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table 1 (Continued)
Study Data
Implicit Income
Gains Necessary
to Avert One
Death (millions) Comments
Duleep (1991) 9,618 white married
male workers aged
35-64 over 6 years,
1973-1978
$3.9 Controls for prior
disability, educa-
tional attainment,
and exposure to oc-
cupational hazards
Duleep (1989) 13,954 white married
male workers aged
25-64 over 6 years,
1973-1978
$6.5 Finds income effects
at all income levels
Wolfson (1992) 500,000 Canadian
workers, over 10-20
years
$6 Investigates longevi-
ty rather than mor-
tality. Finds income
effects at highest
quintiles of income
National
Institutes of
Health (1992)
1,300,000 Americans,
all ages, 1979-1985
$12.4 Estimate reflects
effect of income
changes on family
mortality. Study does
not use multiple re-
gression, does not
control for prior
health status or
education
Chirikos and
Nestel (1991)
5,020 men, aged 50-
64 studied during
1971-1983
$3.3 Uses two measures of
health endowments
Chapman and
Hariharan
(1993)
5,836 older men over
10 years
$12.2 Uses four distinct
controls for prior
health conditions
Graham,
Hung-Chang
and Evans
(1992)
38 years of age-
adjusted mortality
and income data for
the U.S.
$4.0 Distinguishes effects
of permanent income
from those of transi-
tional income
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This point leads to a broader one with considerable implications
for law. Even if agencies are sometimes prevented, by law, from
measuring costs against benefits, perhaps they could compare health
losses with health gains, and conclude that some regulations are not
worthwhile because they cost lives on net. In fact it can be shown
that some regulations fail “health-health analysis” whether or not
they pass cost-benefit analysis. Consider the summary in Table 2.20
The idea that “richer is safer” has started to affect public delib-
erations about risk. In a now-celebrated letter written in 1992, James
McRae, the Acting Administrator of OIRA, wrote to the
Department of Labor, questioning a proposed OSHA regulation
involving air contaminants in the workplace. OSHA had estimated
savings of between eight and thirteen lives per year, at an annual
cost of $163 million. McRae suggested that there was a significant
gap in OSHA’s analysis: If a statistical fatality is produced by an
expenditure of $7.5 million, the regulation could actually cause 22
additional deaths. McRae asked OSHA to investigate the relation
between health, wealth, and safety. OSHA responded that existing
data to the effect that “richer is safer” seemed highly speculative, but
it did call for more comments from the public.21
Eventually a public outcry forced OIRA to retreat. Senator
Glenn in particular complained of OIRA’s “Alice-in-Wonderland
type claim that health and safety regulations cause harm to workers”
and objected that the “richer is safer” view “seems to stand logic on
its head—to say that controlling a dangerous substance in the
workplace makes an increased health hazard to the worker.” Despite
the public outcry, increasing research on the issue suggests that lives
can indeed be lost through required regulatory expenditures, and that
at a minimum there is reason for government to take the problem
seriously.
If officials are to consider the fact that “richer is safer,” it is
important to know whether the burdens of regulation fall on those
who are poor and near-poor or those who are rich. Simple intuition
suggests that a loss in income from relatively poor people will have
                                                                                                               
20Lutter and Morrall, supra, J of Risk and Uncertainty at 59.
2157 Fed Reg 26002, 26005-09 (1992).
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table 2
Regulations Passing HHA vs. BCA Tests
Budgeted Regulations Year Agency Statu
s
Cost-per-
life-saved
(millions
of 1992 $  )
1. Steering column protect. 1967 NHTSA F 0.1
2. Unvented space heaters 1980 CPSC F 0.1
3. Cabin fire protection 1985 FAA F 0.3
4. Passive restraints/belts 1984 NHTSA F 0.4
5. Fuel system integrity 1975 NHTSA F 0.4
6. Trihalomethanes 1979 EPA F 0.4
7. Underground constr. 1989 OSHA-S F 0.4
8. Alcohol & drug control 1985 FRA F 0.7
9. Servicing wheel rims 1984 OSHA-S F 0.7
10. Seat cushion flammability 1984 FAA F 0.8
11. Floor emergency lighting 1984 FAA F 0.9
12. Crane susp. pers. platf 1988 OSHA-S F 1.2
13. Children’s sleepware flammability 1973 CPSC F 1.8
14. Side doors 1979 NHTSA F 1.8
15. Concr. & masonry constr. 1988 OSHA-S F 1.9
16. Hazard communication 1983 OSHA-S F 2.4
17. Asbestos 1986 OSHA-H F 2.8
18. Benzene/fugitive emiss. 1984 EPA F 3.8
     Regulations failing BCA tes t
19. Grain dust 1987 OSHA-S F 8.8
20. Radionuclides/uran. mines 1984 EPA F 9.3
     Regulations failing HHA (and BCA) test
21. Benzene 1987 OSHA-H F 23.1
22. Ethylene oxide 1984 OSHA-H F 34.6
23. Uran. mill tail./inact. 1983 EPA F 37.3
24. Acrylonitrile 1978 OSHA-H F 50.8
25. Uran. mill tail./active 1983 EPA F 71.6
26. Asbestos 1989 EPA F 72.9
27. Coke ovens 1976 OSHA-H F 83.4
28. Arsenic 1978 OSHA-H F 125.0
29. DES (cattlefeed) 1979 FDA F 178.0
30. Arsenic/glass manufact. 1986 EPA F 192.0
31. Benzene/storage 1984 EPA R 273.0
32. Radionuclides/DOE facil. 1984 EPA R 284.0
33. Radionuclides/elim. phos. 1984 EPA R 365.0
34. Acrylonitrile 1978 OSHA-H R 416.0
35. Benzene/ethylbenz./styr. 1984 EPA R 652.0
36. Benzene/maleic anhydride 1984 EPA R 1,107.0
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37. Formaldehyde 1987 OSHA-H F 119,000.0
more severe health effects than a similar loss from the relatively well-
off. A recent study confirms the intuition.22 It suggests that when
program costs are borne exclusively by the richest 20 percent of the
population, mortality effects are one-half as high as when program
costs are borne exclusively by the poorest 20 percent of the nation.23
Thus it is necessary to know the distributional incidence of costs in
order to see the extent to which “richer is safer.”
C. Why Does It Matter?
We have now seen enough to know that an impressive body of
work attempts to measure health gains from regulation against
health risks from regulation. But why should we focus on this
particular question? Why would it not be better to attend to the
overall gains from regulation and to the overall losses from regula-
tion? Cost-benefit analysis is receiving considerable attention in
both agencies and Congress, and cost-benefit analysis, properly
conceived, takes account of all of the health-related effects of
regulation. Health-health assessments focus on a subset of effects,
and refuse to translate those effects into dollars. Such assessments
ignore all costs unrelated to mortality and morbidity. But what is
special about health-health tradeoffs? Why should analysts focus on
such tradeoffs rather than on all relevant effects?
Part of the answer lies in existing public judgments, taken as
simple brute facts. People seem to think that regulation is bad if it
causes more deaths than it saves; a demonstration to this effect
counts strongly against regulation. But people do not always know
how to compare health gains (15 lives gained, for example) with
monetary losses (an expenditure of $15 million, for example). This
uncertainty stems partly from the fact that lives and dollars are not
easily made commensurable, and partly from the fact that the
appropriate amount to spend on protection of a (statistical) life very
much depends on context. A deliberative judgment on net health
                                                                                                               
22See Kenneth Chapman and Govind Hariharan, Do Poor People Have
A Stronger Relationship Between Income and Mortality Than the Rich?. 12 J
Risk and Uncertainty 51 (1996).
23Id. at 59.
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tradeoffs is easier to reach than a deliberative judgment on other
sorts of tradeoffs.
It would, however, be inadequate for present purposes to point
to existing public judgments, which may be irrational or confused.
Perhaps public uncertainty about cost-benefit judgments depends on
an obstinate and counterproductive unwillingness to acknowledge
that even (risk to) life has its price and that risks are matters of
degree rather than “dangerous or not.”24 But part of the answer can
be found in information costs. The comparative defect of health-
health assessment is also its virtue: it involves only a subset of the
consequences of regulation. Some such assessment can be under-
taken with fewer facts.
Another part of the answer may lie in attending more closely to
problems of incommensurability. We might understand incommen-
surability to arise when no single metric is available by which to as-
sess variables at stake in a social decision.25 In the area of risk
regulation, a single metric is troublesome simply because it elides
qualitative distinctions. Cost-benefit analysis attempts to provide
such a metric. And if all effects are reduced to the metric of dollars,
it may be possible to make simple assessments, in the sense that
comparisons and hence tradeoffs can become easier. But reduction
of mortality and morbidity effects to dollars can erase important
qualitative distinctions among diverse risks. It is important for offi-
cials to have a sense of these distinctions when they make decisions.
It is in the face of qualitative distinctions that participants in
democratic deliberation often resist a metric of dollars. To say this is
not to say that there is a problem of incomparability or that tradeoffs
do not have to be made among qualitatively diverse goods. But
perhaps people can make choices more easily when the tradeoffs
involve qualitatively indistinguishable things, like lives, rather than
qualitatively diverse things, like lives and dollars. When it is hard to
trade off lives against dollars, the burdens of judgment might be
eased when we are trading off lives against lives. A judgment of this
kind undoubtedly underlies the interest in “health-health analysis.”
                                                                                                               
24On people’s reluctance to acknowledge this, see Redelmeier et al,
Understanding Patients’ Decisions, 270 JAMA 72, 72-73 (1993).
25See Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich L
Rev 779 (1994).
Health-Health Tradeoffs 15
There is considerable truth to this suggestion. But it is a bit too
crude. As we shall see, lives are themselves not commensurable, in
the sense that a single metric—“lives saved”—is itself too coarse-
grained to account for people’s considered judgments. We do not
reason well if we think that two lives should always be traded for,
say, two and a half; a great deal depends on the context in which
statistical lives are put at risk.26 For this reason problems of
incommensurability cannot be eliminated so easily. They play a large
role in health-health comparisons too.
What solutions are possible? It is possible to reduce these
problems by looking not at total lives lost or gained, but at the
effects of regulations on the number of quality-adjusted life years.27
A regulation that saves thirteen children while jeopardizing fifteen
elderly people may well be worthwhile. Government might thus
focus on statistical years rather than statistical lives. In this way
problems of incommensurability might be reduced through certainly
not eliminated.
III. Incorporating Health-Health Comparisons
A. First Approximation
Let us try, in a simple, intuitive way, to identify the factors that
should enter into deliberative judgments about health-health
tradeoffs. Begin with a simple case in which the costs of informa-
tion and inquiry are zero. If this is so, all agencies should investigate
all risks potentially at stake. Agencies should always take account of
ancillary risks and always try to limit overall or aggregate risks.
Of course the costs of investigation and inquiry are never zero; in
fact they are often very high. We can readily imagine that agencies
could spend all their time investigating ancillary risks, and never do
                                                                                                               
26“There are deep and fundamental and intuitively understood grounds for
rejecting the view that confines itself merely to checking the parity of
outcomes, the view that matches death for death, happiness for happiness,
fulfillment for fulfillment, irrespective of how all this death, happiness, and
fulfillment comes about.” Amartya Sen, Freedoms and Needs, New Republic 31,
32-33 (Jan 11, 1993).
27Zeckhauser and Shepherd, Where Now For Saving Lives? 40 L &
Contemp Probs 5 (1976).
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anything else—a disaster for regulatory policy. (This is a potential
problem with cost-benefit analysis: Cost-benefit analysis may itself
fail cost-benefit analysis—if the costs of undertaking cost-benefit
analysis are high and the benefits lower.) When the costs of inquiry
are not zero, the obligation to inquire into ancillary risks might be a
function of several factors. First is the cost of delay, understood as
the cost of not controlling the regulated risk until more information
has been compiled. To figure out this cost, it is necessary to explore
the seriousness of the regulated risk and the length of time necessary
to investigate the ancillary risk. Second is the cost of investigating
the ancillary risk, where this cost is understood as a product of the
cost of compiling and evaluating the relevant information. Third is
the benefit of investigating the ancillary risk, with the benefit un-
derstood as the likelihood of uncovering information that might
help to produce a different and better result.
Under this view, it is of course (and unfortunately) important to
know at least something about the possible extent of the ancillary
risks and the costs of discovering it. Hence there is a problem of
circularity: It is impossible to know whether to undertake health-
health analysis without doing a bit of health-health analysis, at least
by making some initial judgments about the ancillary risk—a risk
that, by hypothesis, has not yet been explored. Before the actual
investigation has occurred, there will be a good deal of intuition and
guesswork; the full facts cannot be known until inquiries have been
completed, and the real question is whether it is worthwhile to
complete the inquiries or even to embark on them.
But even at an early stage, it is possible to know that some ancil-
lary risks are likely to be high, while others are trivial or low.
Moreover, some ancillary risks can be investigated relatively inexpen-
sively, while others depend on scientific and predictive judgments
that require an enormous investment of resources. There is an anal-
ogy here in the question whether and when agencies must explore
alternatives under the National Environmental Policy Act or the
APA. Here courts have indicated that some but not all alternatives
must be investigated, and the outcome turns on considerations like
those I have discussed here.28 Of course an agency might be reluc-
tant to inquire into ancillary risks on the theory that if it does so, it
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will be unable to regulate the risk at issue before it is too late. Thus it
seems clear that the extent and nature of the regulated risk are
crucial factors for those deciding whether to explore ancillary risks.
On this simple, intuitive view, an agency might think in the
following way: If it would be enormously expensive to investigate
whether fuel economy standards would really produce smaller and
more dangerous cars, if the fuel economy standards would them-
selves do a lot of good, and if the likelihood of a high ancillary risk
seems small, then it makes sense to proceed with the fuel economy
standards without investigating the ancillary risks.29 On the other
hand, it is easy to imagine a scenario in which investigation of
ancillary risks is reasonable, or when failure to investigate would be
irrational. Thus the National Highway Transportation Safety
Authority’s (NHTSA) actual position with respect to fuel economy
standards and safety is that the ancillary risk is worth investigating.
Compare the question how to handle ancillary risks created by
the prohibited manufacture of asbestos. One ancillary risk arises
from the fact that asbestos appears to be the best product for use in
brake linings, and existing substitutes are worse. Whether this is
true, and how serious the ancillary risk is, can be investigated at the
present time. But other ancillary risks involve the substitutes for
asbestos in products for which no substitutes are now available. On
the view of the EPA, the ban on asbestos will force technological
innovation, producing new substances that do the work now done
by asbestos.30 This may be a reasonable view. If so, the government
has reason to regulate asbestos now and to wait before evaluating
any substitute risks.
B. Existing Law and Its Rationale
How should we understand existing law in light of this first
approximation? Congress has apparently forbidden health-health
analysis in many settings, by directing agencies to focus on certain
health problems and not to inquire into others. Questions therefore
arise about what understanding, if any, accounts for the prohibition.
                                                                                                               
29Cf. EPA’s position in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201
(5th Cir. 1991).
30Id.
18 Chicago Working Paper in Law & Economics
Some of the relevant statutes might be seen to reflect categorical,
rule-bound judgments reflecting factors of the kind just discussed.
Congress might think, for example, that the NRC should not ask
whether regulation of nuclear power will cause a shift to coal-fired
power plants and thus aggravate the problem of acid deposition,
because the problem of unsafe nuclear power is an especially serious
one, because nuclear power regulation is by itself unlikely to produce
significant increases in acid deposition, and because it is very hard for
the NRC, given its limited budget and expertise, to make the
necessary extrapolations. Under the considerations I have discussed,
the NRC might plausibly be exempted from the duty of exploring
ancillary risks, or even banned from doing so.
Alternatively, the problems posed by ancillary risks might be
solved by a healthy division of labor. Any effects on automobile
safety that come from air pollution regulation that produces smaller
cars might be controlled by the NHTSA. Perhaps NHTSA has the
authority to make sure that the ancillary risk does not come to
fruition. Any adverse effects of EPA regulation could be prevented
by NHTSA.  Perhaps the two agencies will coordinate their efforts
to ensure that aggregate risks are minimized. Or consider the health
risks from regulation inducing employment and poverty. It might be
thought that the disemployment effects of regulation are or should
be addressed by other governmental institutions, including those
entrusted with the power to reduce unemployment and poverty.
Of course there are serious problems with the division of labor
strategy. Coordination of risk regulation is difficult to achieve, and
in modern government, it has not been pursued in any systematic
way. In any case it would be surprising if a healthy division of labor
accounted for existing practice, for there is no evidence that agencies
systematically respond to increases in ancillary risk created by
regulation.
Another explanation for existing authority to consider some risks
but not others would point to the important role of interest groups in
the regulatory process.31 On this view, the disparities in regulatory
strategies are attributable to the fact that well-organized groups are
able to obtain legislation in their interest, or to fend off harmful
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regulation. It should be unsurprising that the statute regulating
agricultural practices allows for a form of open-ended balancing; the
agricultural groups are in a good position to fend off draconian
legislation. Some environmental groups work very hard to obtain
severe restrictions on carcinogenic substances.
In fact interest groups might work together so as to redistribute
risks, and the resulting coalitions might well ban agencies from
engaging in health-health analysis, for fear that the result will be a
failure of redistribution. If, for example, corn producers attempt to
obtain an ethanol requirement for gasoline, they may not be
disturbed to find that ethanol itself imposes environmental risks. Or
if it happens that electric cars produce environmental hazards
because of waste disposal problems, the redistribution of the risk may
not be bothersome to those who favor electric cars on self-interested
grounds. It would even be possible to imagine cases in which the
redistributed risk was affirmatively sought, if, for example, those who
face the new risk are competitors. Undoubtedly an investigation of
the political economy of risk regulation would reveal many diverse
cases in which interest groups pursue their own interests rather than
overall risk reduction.
Other explanations would point to myopia, selective attention,
sensationalism, loss aversion, credit-claiming, and random agenda
selection as important forces in the production of risk regulation.32
Some statutes stem from sensationalistic events, like the Love Canal
scare, that encourage legislators to hold hearings and claim credit for
fixing problems that are not large or that are just part of a complex
whole. Such statutes are likely to reflect myopia or selective
attention. The result may well be a form of random agenda selection
that bans health-health tradeoffs, that does not adequately reduce
risks, or that even increases some risks. People are pervasively averse
to losses from the status quo—more so than they are favorably
inclined to improvements from the status quo—and loss aversion
may account for apparently irrational judgments about how to trade
off health risks.33
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Finally, some statutes might reflect public judgments about how
to conduct health-health tradeoffs. Perhaps the public believes that
an increase in a certain risk is not a relevant factor in the assessment
of another risk. This could be a product of simple confusion, as in
the well-established refusal, on the part of some of the public some
of the time, to acknowledge any need for tradeoffs.34 Such judg-
ments should not be given any weight in law; but Congress,
responsive to the electorate, appears to disagree with this proposi-
tion. Or public judgments might be based on heuristics of certain
kinds, productive of errors,35 or instead of gripping anecdotes that
make draconian regulation of a certain risk seem quite sensible. In
these ways, relevant judgments could be confused, and we might
seek a form of expert judgment that would produce more in the way
of regulatory rationality.36 Some such judgments might, however,
result from something other than confusion. They might depend
on judgments about sensible regulatory priorities and about
qualitative differences among risks. I take up this point below.
C. Incorporating Complexities
Our first approximation has suggested that all risks should be
aligned along a single metric—expected annual deaths, aggregate
benefits and costs—and hence measured against one another. Both
expert and economic approaches attempt to do this, though in
interestingly different ways. Experts tend to look at expected annual
deaths and to assess risks accordingly.37 But ordinary people base
their judgments on something other than this. They look, for
example, at whether the risk is faced voluntarily or involuntarily;
whether it is equitably distributed; whether it is faced by future
generations; whether it is potentially catastrophic; whether it
involves a death that is especially dreaded; and whether it is new and
poorly understood. Consider the following table.
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table 3
Risk Characteristic Aggravating Factor Mitigating Factor
Nature of Risk dreaded acceptable
Permanence irreversible/uncontrollable reversible/controllable
Duration faced by future generations faced by those now
living
Equity unfairly distributed fairly distributed
Source of Risk man-made found in nature
Freedom voluntarily incurred forced exposure
Existing Understanding known to science unknown
Relation to Status Quo new old
If aggravating and mitigating factors are taken into account, it
might well be the case that people would find, say, 300 cases of
cancer more acceptable than 350 cases of heart disease, given certain
assumptions about what causes each. In contingent valuation
studies, people purport to be willing to pay far more to prevent
cancer deaths (from $1.5 million to $9.5 million) than they would to
prevent unforeseen instant deaths (from $1 million to $5 million).38
It is similarly possible that people might therefore accept a regulated
risk involving 100 annual fatalities even if the ancillary risk involves
110 annual fatalities; perhaps the ancillary risk is less severe because it
is voluntarily run, not especially dreaded, and well understood. The
democratic decision to look at something other than quantity is easy
to defend. It is also fully rational.
We come, then, to a complication for the initial approximation:
Risks should be evaluated in accordance with the various qualitative
factors deemed relevant by ordinary people who are evaluating risk.39
At least this is so if ordinary people are not behaving irrationally or
ignoring the need for tradeoffs.40 Of course it would be possible to
assign numbers to these factors if this step aided analysis.
Economic approaches promise to avoid some of the problems of
expert valuations. Most important, private willingness to pay should
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incorporate some or even all of the factors that underlie ordinary lay
judgments. It might be possible to ascertain private willingness to
pay from studies of actual market behavior and from contingent val-
uation studies.41 And from these results it is possible to derive valua-
tions of diverse social risks. Consider the following table.42
table 4
Mortality Values by Cause of Death
Category                  V    alue     E     stimates    (     millions    $)                 
(per statistical life) Low Medium High
Unforeseen Instant
Death
1.0 2.0 5.0
Asthma/Bronchitis 1.3 2.5 5.5
Heart Disease 1.25 2.75 6.0
Emphysema 1.4 3.5 9.0
Lung Cancer 1.5 4.0 9.5
There are, however, enormous difficulties in the idea that
officials can get, from private willingness to pay, an adequate sense
of how to order the risks at stake in regulation. Health-health
tradeoffs cannot easily be based on surrogates for market valuation.
Actual choices are “noisy”; from a market decision—to take a job, to
buy a Volvo, to get a smoke alarm—it is not easy to derive a
consistent valuation of life. Such decisions are highly geared to the
context in which they are made; it is not clear that one can infer
from actual choices in one context people’s valuations about other
choices in a different context.
Contingent valuation studies can build in a sense of context, but
the answers may not be reliable. They may well be a product of
strategic behavior, of questions and answers not thought meaningful
in real life, or of a perceived purchase of moral satisfaction rather
than any commodity. Valuation is greatly affected by whether the
good is offered alone or in connection with other goods; wildly
different responses can be obtained depending on the sequence of
questions; and people often give the same amount to reflect their
willingness to save 200, 2,000, or 20,000 members of a certain
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species.43 In any case democratic choices should reflect a process of
reason-giving in which it is asked what policies are best to pursue,
rather than a process of preference-satisfaction in which each person
is asked how much he is willing to pay for a certain result.
Deliberative outcomes should not be confused with aggregated
willingness to pay.
Government officials must, in these circumstances, proceed
pragmatically and experimentally, perhaps by taking aggregate num-
bers based on expert judgments as a starting point, focusing on
number of quality-adjusted life-years saved rather than simply lives
saved, and invoking the supplemental considerations, involving
democratic convictions, that I have described here.
IV. Courts and Existing Law
I now turn to existing law. If an agency takes account of
ancillary risks, has it behaved unlawfully? If an agency refuses to
consider such risks, should courts require it to do so?
A. Consideration of Ancillary Risks
Suppose first that an agency actually considers health-health
tradeoffs. Is it permitted to do so under existing law? Agencies have
considerable flexibility here, since under current doctrine agencies
have a good deal of discretion to interpret ambiguous statutes as they
see fit.44 If the governing statute is ambiguous, agencies should be
permitted to consider health-health tradeoffs.
Sometimes, however, statutes are unambiguous on this point,
and ancillary risks are excluded as reasons for regulatory action or
inaction. Under the Delaney Clause, for example, the FDA was
generally believed to be banned from considering the possibility that
the exclusion of foods with carcinogens will increase risks from (say)
heart disease. The FDA was apparently prohibited from considering
this or any other ancillary risk. A similar problem arises under the
toxic substances provision of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, which probably bans OSHA from asking whether richer is
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safer, or even from balancing workplace risks against ancillary risks
created by regulation.
But sometimes agencies are given sufficiently broad authority,
and they may, if they choose, consider ancillary risks. For example,
the basic pesticide statute (FIFRA) provides that agencies must ask
whether pesticides produce “unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment,” and this term requires the agency to take “into
account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits
of the use of any pesticide.”45 Thus FIFRA certainly authorizes
EPA to consider the possibility that any regulation would create
aggregate harms. The Toxic Substances Control Act reads in similar
terms. The Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act allow government to consider a broad range of good and bad
environmental effects in requiring technologies to reduce air and
water pollution. Outside of the context of toxic substances, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act defines occupational safety and
health standards as those “reasonably necessary or appropriate” to the
goal of ensuring “safe or healthy employment and places of
employment.”46 OSHA may reasonably decide that a standard is not
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” if the effect of the regulation is
to lose aggregate lives. It is permitted to consider the effects of
regulation in causing risks to life and health through poverty and
unemployment.
We might go further. As noted, courts generally defer to reason-
able agency interpretations of law. In addition, statutes are generally
interpreted so as to avoid absurdity, even in the face of apparently
clear text.47 For the modern regulatory state, it would make sense for
courts to adopt a new interpretive principle to the effect that agencies
are permitted to minimize net risks to life and health, a principle that
Congress can overcome only with a clear statement to the contrary. This
principle makes particular sense in light of the fact that the agency is
in the best position to decide whether consideration of health-
health tradeoffs would be feasible, or instead a barrier to successful
implementation of the underlying statute. Compared with courts,
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agencies are both technically expert and democratically accountable;
they are also in a uniquely good position to obtain a systematic
overview of the statutes they administer, and that position can
enable them to counteract unintended harmful consequences.48 If
an agency tries to administer the statute so as to ensure that ancillary
health risks are considered, it should be allowed to do so. Congress
should not lightly or by inadvertence be taken to have forbidden
agencies from ensuring that regulations do not create net harm, and
that they create the greatest possible net benefit.
This idea casts some doubt on the courts’ approach to the
Delaney Clause. In Les v. Reilly,49 the EPA sought to create a de
minimis exception to the Clause insofar as it prohibits the use of any
food additive that is found to “induce cancer.” The FDA made a
similar argument in Public Citizen v. Young,50 where the agency
sought to exempt substances that created a one-in-a-million lifetime
risk of cancer—the same risk that would be run if a consumer ate
one peanut with the FDA-permitted level once every 250 days, and a
risk less than one-two hundred thousandth the lifetime risk incurred
by the average male smoker. In both cases, the government urged in
essence that “de minimis non curat lex.” But in Les, part of the
EPA’s rationale came close to a suggestion that the exception may
well, on balance, decrease risks to life and health. According to the
EPA, the Clause might allow substances on the market that are
actually less dangerous that other substances that are permitted
because they do not concentrate in processed foods.
In neither case did the government seriously press the claim that
the Delaney Clause, if interpreted literally, would increase health
risks. If the government had done so, and offered a convincing
factual demonstration to that effect, it should have been permitted
to interpret the Clause so as to decrease risk on balance. The practice
of statutory construction is pervaded by interpretive principles de-
signed to give reason and justice the benefit of the doubt.51 To
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existing principles the courts should add a suggestion that if at all
possible, statutes will not be construed so as to block agencies from
taking account of health-health tradeoffs.
B. Refusal To Consider Ancillary Risks
Now suppose that an agency refuses to consider, or to make de-
cisive, the fact that its decision to reduce one risk increases another
risk. Perhaps a new regulatory initiative from the NRC would
increase the risks from coal-fired power plants. Is the NRC’s refusal
to consider such risks unlawful? The first question is whether the
statute requires consideration of ancillary risks. The second question
is whether, if the statute does not do so, the agency’s decision is
nonetheless arbitrary or capricious.
As we have seen, many statutes do not require agencies to
consider ancillary risks. In any case, courts defer to reasonable agency
interpretations of statutes,52 and thus in many instances the agency
will have the authority to decide whether to consider ancillary risks.
If the agency has the statutory authority not to consider ancillary
risks, it is unlikely, under current law, to be found that its decision
not to do so was arbitrary. The judgment about arbitrariness should
and probably would be based on a framework like that set out in
Part II above.53 In an extreme case, failure to consider risks that are
likely to be large, and that are not terribly costly to investigate, might
be seen as arbitrary within the meaning of the APA.54 Indeed, I
believe—for reasons to be elaborated shortly—that courts should be
less reluctant than they now are to find agency action arbitrary on
this ground.
A great deal of course turns on existing information. When the
data about ancillary risks are speculative or unreliable, agencies are
probably not required to consider such risks. OSHA could lawfully
conclude—as it has in fact concluded—that the evidence that “richer
is safer” is too speculative to be used at this time. Its decision to this
effect ought not to be found arbitrary or capricious unless it can be
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shown that the evidence is in fact solid and that the costs of incor-
porating it are reasonable. The relevant provision of the statute—the
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” language—gives OSHA
discretion to do with this evidence as it chooses. Under FIFRA, by
contrast, an agency that fails to consider ancillary risks would
probably be violating the statute, at least on a showing that the
ancillary risks are real and the costs of investigation are not excessive.
Consider in this regard the principal case involving the issue of
health-health tradeoffs, Competitive Enterprise Institute v.
NHTSA.55 NHTSA establishes fuel economy standards; in doing
so, NHTSA is required to consider the issue of “feasibility.” In
deciding the question of feasibility, NHTSA has taken account of
passenger safety, including risks created by regulation, and while
there is a possible statutory issue here, everyone in CEI accepted
NHTSA’s views on this point. The question in the case was
whether NHTSA had acted lawfully in refusing to relax its fuel
economy standards for certain model years. Automobile companies
urged that relaxation was required in order to save lives—because the
existing standards would lead to “downsizing” and hence to smaller
and more dangerous vehicles—and they presented strong evidence to
this effect.
The agency responded that this evidence was unconvincing and
that “domestic manufacturers should be able to improve their fuel
economy in the future by . . . technological means, without out-
sourcing their larger cars, without further downsizing or mix shifts
toward smaller cars, and without sacrificing acceleration or perfor-
mance.”56 The court held that this explanation was inadequate. The
agency failed to claim or show that in fact, manufacturers would fail
to downsize their cars. In any case downsizing would be costly, and
that “cost would translate into higher prices for large cars (as well as
small), thereby pressuring consumers to retain their old cars and
make the associated sacrifice in safety. The result would be
effectively the same harm that concerns petitioners and that the
agency fails to negate or justify.”57 The court therefore remanded to
the agency for a better explanation or a change in policy.
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On remand, the agency offered a somewhat better explanation.
NHTSA pointed to what it saw as the absence of clear indications
that fuel economy standards had caused any manufacturer to price
consumers out of the market for larger, safer cars. NHTSA referred
as well to an absence of manufacturer claims about the specific
design standards that would result from the standards. The court
found this explanation sufficient. In doing so, it applied a highly
deferential form of review.
In light of the record, however, and the predictable pressures on
an agency like NHTSA, the result in the case might well be
questioned. NHTSA may well suffer from a form of “tunnel vision,”
especially in dealing with fuel economy standards, for which there is
a powerful constituency. The interests that call for attention to
ancillary safety risks are typically poorly organized, and when the
claims come from the automobile manufacturers, NHTSA may be
too ready to distrust them. To say this is not to say that NHTSA
should be required to relax its fuel economy standards. But it is to say
that a demonstration of the sort made by the automobile manufac-
turers might well serve as a kind of warning signal to the court,
requiring a solid response from the agency. In CEI, the agency’s
response could not qualify as solid, as the court itself, while affirming
the agency, seemed to suggest. A promising model for the future is
provided by an important court of appeals decision holding that
under a statute that required open-ended balancing of relevant
factors, an agency was required to ask whether the risks that would
substitute for asbestos would lead to even greater risks.58
The point I am making here might well be generalized.
Agencies ought generally to be required to show that they are doing
more good than harm.59 This does not mean that courts should
engage in independent review of agency judgments on this score.
But it does mean that courts should take a “hard look” at agency
decisions failing to undertake health-health comparisons.
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V. New Institutions
A. Congress
In its present form, Congress is ill equipped to consider the
problem of health-health tradeoffs. Its committee structure ensures
a high degree of fragmentation and does not allow for deliberation
on such tradeoffs. On the contrary, that structure makes ancillary
risks difficult to evaluate or, much worse, even to see. Often ancillary
risks are thought to be subject to the jurisdiction of another
committee, which means, in practice, that coordination is extremely
difficult. In these circumstances, I offer two simple suggestions for
legislative reform.
The first is that Congress should create a new legislative
committee entrusted specifically with the power to assess aggregate
risk levels, to compare risks, and to initiate revision of statutes that
increase net risks. This committee should have the power to intro-
duce corrective legislation when a statute, or agency action under a
statute, has been shown to increase aggregate risks. Congress’
current efforts in this regard are far too modest. Speaker Gingrich’s
introduction of a regular “Corrections Day” may provide some
modest deterrence and offer protection against abuses; but it is far
too irregular to provide the sort of coordination that is needed. No
institution in Congress is in a position to ensure against selective
attention in lawmaking; a new committee could help solve this
problem.
My second suggestion is that Congress should address the
problem of health-health tradeoffs through a new directive in the
Administrative Procedure Act. Notably, recent initiatives designed
to require cost-benefit balancing say almost nothing about this
problem. The principal exception is a House bill introduced in 1995,
which contains a subsection entitled “Substitution Risks.” This
subsection says that “each significant risk assessment or risk
characterization document shall include a statement of any substitu-
tion risks to human health, where information on such risks has
been provided to the agency.”60
But this is a strikingly modest initiative. It does not require
agencies to investigate ancillary risks on their own. Nor does it say
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that agencies may not proceed unless the regulation yields net
benefits. I suggest instead a new amendment to the Administrative
Procedure Act: “Agencies shall ensure, to the extent feasible, that
regulations do not create countervailing risks that are greater than those
of the regulated risk.” A modest forerunner of this idea can be found
in the “clean fuels” provision of the Clean Air Act, which says that
the Administrator of EPA may not prohibit the use of a fuel or fuel
addictive “unless he finds . . . that in his judgment such prohibition
will not cause the use of any other fuel or fuel additive which will
produce emissions which will endanger the public health or welfare
to the same or greater degree than the use of the fuel or fuel additive
proposed to be prohibited.”61 This idea should be generalized. The
words “to the extent feasible” are necessary because some
investigations are too costly and speculative to be worthwhile.
B. Executive Branch
The OIRA has been entrusted with the power to coordinate
regulatory policy and to ensure reasonable priority-setting. In the
Clinton Administration, OIRA appears to have become an advisory
body, more limited in its power than it was in the Bush and Reagan
administrations. In view of the absence of good priority-setting, and
the enormous room for saving costs and increasing regulatory
benefits, this is highly unfortunate.
OIRA should see, as one of its central assignments, the task of
overcoming governmental tunnel vision, by ensuring that aggregate
risks are reduced and that agency focus on particular risks does not
mean that ancillary risks are ignored or increased. This is a more
modest and particularized version of Justice Breyer’s larger suggestion
that OIRA should have a power to set priorities by diverting
resources from smaller problems to larger ones.62 No body in
government is now entrusted with the authority of ensuring that
risk regulation is managed so as to ensure global rationality and
coherence. OIRA is well situated to take on that role, at least by
attending to the possibility that regulation of some risks may make
risk levels higher on balance.
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Conclusion
On the fiftieth anniversary of the Administrative Procedure Act,
it would be far too simple to say that the administrative state has
been a failure. In many ways, it has been a substantial success; risks
to safety and health are much lower than they have been in the past,
partly because of regulatory safeguards.63 But current programs are
far more costly, and far less effective, than they should be. Reforms
to the Administrative Procedure Act, as that act was originally
envisaged, would be far too modest to provide adequate correctives.
Existing difficulties cannot be solved by weakening or intensifying
standards of judicial review, or by increasing or decreasing the
procedures that are required before agencies undertake regulatory
action.
As the twenty-first century approaches, it is especially important
to design regulatory institutions that counteract the identifiable
problems of modern regulation, which usually stem from selective
attention in the form of inadequate concern for setting priorities, for
providing good incentives, and for minimizing harmful side effects.
The relevant reforms would justify an Administrative Substance Act
of the general sort that is receiving considerable current attention in
Congress.
Among the principal side effects, not well addressed in current
proposals or existing law, is the increased risk sometimes produced by
risk regulation. Selective attention of this kind is a natural outcome
of the cognitive limitations of human beings; sometimes it is a
product of self-conscious efforts by well-organized private groups. In
any case selective attention can easily be exploited by such groups
intent on redistributing resources in their favor. This is a significant
problem, and through some simple steps, something can be done
about it.
I have emphasized that tradeoffs among risks ought not to be
based on a unitary metric, for reasons of both law and basic
principle. Lives are not commensurable with costs; lives are not even
commensurable with lives. The context in which life is put at risk
matters a great deal. But tradeoffs must nonetheless be made. The
                                                                                                               
63See the evidence in G. Easterbrook, A Moment on the Earth (1995);
Graham & Weiner, supra, at 6-10.
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problem is that public institutions do not undertake this task in a
self-conscious manner. Such institutions should be therefore de-
signed so as to overcome the cognitive problems and to ensure that
the relevant tradeoffs are made in a way that entails more knowledge
and more deliberation. Above all, institutions should be created to
ensure that risk reduction is pursued more frequently than risk
redistribution. To accomplish this task, it is necessary to take steps to
limit the effects of myopia, selective attention, and interest group
influence in the regulatory process.
I have suggested several possible steps. Under existing law,
agencies should often be understood to have the authority to engage
in health-health tradeoffs, and they should exercise that authority
far more often than they now do. Courts should play a modest but
catalytic role in encouraging agencies to increase aggregate risk
reduction. They should do so above all by adopting an interpretive
principle authorizing agencies to undertake health-health tradeoffs
unless Congress has spoken clearly to the contrary. Congress should
create a new committee designed to rank risks and monitor risk
regulation for overall coherence; it should also add to existing
legislation a general requirement that agencies consider all risks, to
the extent that this is feasible. Finally, OIRA (or some similar insti-
tution) should undertake the process of scrutinizing risk regulation
to ensure that agency action does not suffer from the kinds of
“tunnel vision,” and susceptibility to both anecdotes and interest
groups, that are exemplified by so much of modern risk regulation.
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This Working Paper is a preliminary version of an article that will
be published in The University of Chicago Law Review and as a
chapter in Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice
(forthcoming, Oxford University Press). Readers with comments
should address them to:
Cass R. Sunstein
Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor
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